C

Citigroup Price

C
$129.14
+$1.16(+0.90%)

*Data last updated: 2026-04-28 08:27 (UTC+8)

As of 2026-04-28 08:27, Citigroup (C) is priced at $129.14, with a total market cap of $225.92B, a P/E ratio of 14.88, and a dividend yield of 1.82%. Today, the stock price fluctuated between $127.64 and $129.40. The current price is 1.17% above the day's low and 0.20% below the day's high, with a trading volume of 4.07M. Over the past 52 weeks, C has traded between $67.89 to $135.30, and the current price is -4.55% away from the 52-week high.

C Key Stats

Yesterday's Close$127.98
Market Cap$225.92B
Volume4.07M
P/E Ratio14.88
Dividend Yield (TTM)1.82%
Dividend Amount$0.60
Diluted EPS (TTM)9.20
Net Income (FY)$14.26B
Revenue (FY)$168.30B
Earnings Date2026-07-14
EPS Estimate2.58
Revenue Estimate$23.16B
Shares Outstanding1.76B
Beta (1Y)1.085
Ex-Dividend Date2026-05-04
Dividend Payment Date2026-05-22

About C

Citigroup Inc., a diversified financial services holding company, provides various financial products and services to consumers, corporations, governments, and institutions in North America, Latin America, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. The company operates in two segments, Global Consumer Banking (GCB) and Institutional Clients Group (ICG). The GCB segment offers traditional banking services to retail customers through retail banking, Citi-branded cards, and Citi retail services. It also provides various banking, credit card, lending, and investment services through a network of local branches, offices, and electronic delivery systems. The ICG segment offers wholesale banking products and services, including fixed income and equity sales and trading, foreign exchange, prime brokerage, derivative, equity and fixed income research, corporate lending, investment banking and advisory, private banking, cash management, trade finance, and securities services to corporate, institutional, public sector, and high-net-worth clients. As of December 31, 2020, it operated 2,303 branches primarily in the United States, Mexico, and Asia. Citigroup Inc. was founded in 1812 and is headquartered in New York, New York.
SectorFinancial Services
IndustryBanks - Diversified
CEOJane Nind Fraser
HeadquartersNew York City,NY,US
Employees (FY)226.00K
Average Revenue (1Y)$744.69K
Net Income per Employee$63.13K

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Citigroup (C) is currently trading at $129.14, with a 24h change of +0.90%. The 52-week trading range is $67.89–$135.30.

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Citigroup (C) Latest News

2026-04-27 15:21

Canada's Bill C-25 Passes House Principle Vote, Bans Crypto Donations to Federal Political Campaigns

Gate News message, April 27 — Canada's "Strong Free Elections Act" (Bill C-25) passed a principle vote in the House of Commons and was referred to committee for detailed review. The bill, which received cross-party support with minimal substantive opposition, proposes to prohibit donations in cryptocurrency to federal political campaigns. Violators must return or forfeit non-compliant donations to the treasury within 30 days. Canada has technically allowed crypto donations since 2019, though no major political party has publicly accepted them. The legislation aims to close this loophole and establish a uniform standard for campaign financing.

2026-04-26 09:45

Quantitative Trader Killa Predicts Bitcoin Bear Market Bottom at $40,740 or $42,680

Gate News message, April 26 — Quantitative trader Killa shared his prediction for Bitcoin's bear market bottom on April 25, estimating the floor at $38,800. Accounting for approximately 5% variance, he projects the bottom could be either $40,740 or $42,680. Killa previously used a model combining cycle analysis, pattern analysis, and mathematical methods to forecast the current bull market peak at $121,362; the actual peak reached $126,100. He emphasized that even his highest estimate of $42,680 remains significantly below $60,000, describing that level as "extremely bullish" as a bear market floor. Killa plans to accumulate spot Bitcoin purchases as much as possible during July and August.

2026-04-26 02:43

Hong Kong Police Dismantle Cross-Border Fraud Ring Targeting Overseas Students, Seizing HK$5M in Assets

Gate News message, April 26 — Hong Kong police have dismantled a cross-border fraud ring that targeted overseas Chinese students studying abroad, according to local media. The syndicate impersonated law enforcement officials and coerced victims into traveling to Hong Kong to purchase gold bars as "collateral," which were then melted down, converted to cryptocurrency, and laundered. A total of seven cases were reported involving approximately HK$7 million. Police's "Operation Busha" resulted in multiple arrests, with authorities recovering approximately HK$5 million in seized assets. One suspect was remanded in custody and will appear in court; other arrested individuals were released on bail and must report to police in early May. The scheme highlights growing risks of cryptocurrency-based money laundering in transnational fraud operations targeting vulnerable populations abroad.

2026-04-24 00:39

ETH Meme Coin AIB Surges to $7M Market Cap, Up 950x Intraday

Gate News message, April 24 — ETH-based Meme coin AIB (America is BACK) saw its market capitalization briefly spike above $7 million today, currently trading at $5.95 million with an intraday gain exceeding 950x. Meme coins are known for extreme price volatility; investors are advised to exercise caution and manage risk accordingly.

2026-04-23 16:00

DeFi Researchers Propose Credit Risk Quantification Framework for Lending Vaults

Gate News message, April 23 — Researchers including Anastasiia have published a paper titled "Vault as a credit instrument," proposing a credit risk quantification framework for DeFi lending vaults. The research highlights that while DeFi lending vaults manage real user deposits, they lack unified credit risk assessment standards. The framework introduces five core metrics to measure risks across different "mechanical loss channels" and establishes a vault credit scoring system. On-chain execution characteristics—such as oracle deviations, liquidation failures, and network congestion risks—break assumptions in traditional finance credit models, necessitating new quantification methods. The proposed framework combines on-chain data, parameter identification, and stress testing mechanisms to enhance DeFi risk management and transparency standards.

Hot Posts About Citigroup (C)

ZkProver

ZkProver

26 minutes ago
*Author: Anita AGI/acc* On Wall Street, there is a classic signal: when competitors start betting on the same infrastructure, the industry has entered the next phase. This is the current prediction market. On one side is **Polymarket** — the most influential event market in the crypto world; on the other side is **Kalshi** — one of the only event contract exchanges licensed by U.S. regulators. The two paths are completely different: * One is globalized, on-chain, decentralized narrative * The other is compliant, CFTC-regulated, traditional finance track But the CEOs of these two companies have simultaneously invested in a fund, **5(c) Capital**. This matter is more unusual than it appears on the surface. 5(c) Capital is not a large-scale fund, aiming to raise about $35 million. Polymarket CEO Shayne Coplan and Kalshi CEO Tarek Mansour both bet on this fund. These two companies are the two most important players in prediction markets and are direct competitors. The fund is driven by two early Kalshi employees: Adhi Rajaprabhakaran and Noah Zingler-Sternig. The former was a Kalshi trader, the latter was head of operations at Kalshi. Polymarket was founded in 2020. The true background of 5(c) is not an old fund that has been investing since 2020, but a group of people who have explored the underlying issues in Kalshi’s early market structure, turning their experience into a fund. 5(c) is not a traditional thematic fund. It’s more like a capital tool organized by insiders of the industry. * * * ### 5(c) invests not in platforms, but in the arms depot behind platform wars Public materials show that 5(c) plans to invest in about 20 companies, focusing on market makers, index design, and prediction market infrastructure. It’s not aiming to invest in “the next Polymarket,” nor “the next Kalshi.” It’s betting on: * Who provides liquidity to prediction markets; * Who designs event indices; * Who creates cross-platform data; * Who develops trading tools; * Who handles risk management and monitoring; * Who defines result settlement; * Who transforms prediction markets from retail betting into an institutional asset class. Platforms can compete, but infrastructure can be shared. Polymarket needs depth, Kalshi also needs depth; Polymarket needs more trustworthy prices, Kalshi also needs them; Polymarket needs institutional entry, Kalshi needs it even more. It’s betting on the entire prediction market ecosystem, not just a single entry point. * * * ### Why is it people from Kalshi’s team doing this? The lineage of 5(c) is clear: Kalshi. Kalshi’s path is completely different from Polymarket. Polymarket is a crypto-native growth machine, rapidly expanding through globalization, on-chain assets, and event narratives. Kalshi, on the other hand, chose the U.S. regulatory route, dealing long-term with the CFTC, state regulators, and the boundaries of event contracts. Therefore, people coming from Kalshi naturally care about: * Which events can be designed as contracts; * Which events should not be traded; * Which markets are susceptible to manipulation; * Why market makers are reluctant to participate; * How traders can exploit non-public information; * Where regulatory tightening will eventually occur. This perspective differs from that of a typical crypto fund. A typical crypto fund sees growth curves; Kalshi’s team sees market structure. The biggest problem with prediction markets has never been “whether someone wants to bet.” Humans have always wanted to bet. The question is: can this betting behavior be packaged into financial markets and withstand regulation, liquidity issues, manipulation, settlement disputes, and institutional scrutiny? 5(c) invests in infrastructure to answer this question. * * * ### Will prediction markets be monopolized by a few giants? Very likely. Prediction markets seem infinitely expandable because new events happen every day. But markets that can actually facilitate effective trading are rare. Most events lack enough traders, liquidity, or clear settlement standards. This results in a pattern: the more concentrated the liquidity, the more trustworthy the prices; the more trustworthy the prices, the more users; the more users, the more market makers are willing to come; the more market makers, the further liquidity concentrates. This is a typical network effect of exchanges. Stock trading, options, futures—all follow this pattern. Ultimately, markets won’t be evenly distributed across 100 platforms but will concentrate in a few exchanges, clearinghouses, market makers, and data terminals. Prediction markets will be no exception. In the next 12–24 months, prediction markets are likely to form a three-tier monopoly: **First layer: Front-end platform monopoly** Polymarket and Kalshi are currently closest to this position. Polymarket dominates the crypto-native and global user mindshare; Kalshi dominates the U.S. regulatory entry point. Their paths differ, but both are vying for the default position of “event contract exchange.” **Second layer: Liquidity monopoly** The real value may not be in the platform itself, but in the market-making network. If an institution can serve Polymarket, Kalshi, and other trading venues simultaneously, providing cross-market market-making, arbitrage, and price stabilization, it could become the Jane Street or Citadel of prediction markets. This is likely what 5(c) most wants to invest in. **Third layer: Data monopoly** Once prediction market prices are used by media, funds, companies, and AI agents, the probabilities themselves will become data products. In the future, someone will sell: * U.S. recession probability; * Interest rate cut probability; * War risk index; * Election volatility; * AI breakthrough probability; * Corporate event probabilities. This will become the Bloomberg of prediction markets. Whoever controls data distribution controls the interpretation rights. * * * ### Insider trading is not a fringe issue but the “original sin” of prediction markets Prediction markets rely on insider trading, but insider trading is killing them. In traditional finance, insider trading is a market flaw; in prediction markets, insider information is almost part of the product’s allure. Because prediction markets sell “who knows the future earlier.” The problem is, if those who know the future early start betting, is the market discovering information or rewarding corruption? Recent regulatory pressure has made this clear. An AP report states that prediction markets are under increased scrutiny due to concerns over insider trading and illegal gambling, including cases where military personnel are accused of betting on sensitive military operations with non-public information, and politicians participating in markets related to their own elections. Kalshi recently penalized and suspended three congressional candidates who bet on markets related to their campaigns. Although the amounts were small, the incident hits the prediction market’s most vulnerable point: if candidates, government employees, military personnel, regulators, and executives can trade on non-public information they hold, prices are no longer just “collective wisdom,” but potentially “power monetization.” Several U.S. states have also begun action. New York, California, Illinois have recently imposed restrictions on government employees trading prediction markets with non-public information. The governor of New York signed an executive order banning state employees from profiting from insider information obtained through their positions on prediction markets like Kalshi and Polymarket. This is regulators telling the market: if prediction markets want to enter mainstream finance, they cannot continue to grow on the back of gray-area information profits. Here’s a paradox. Prediction markets are valuable because they absorb dispersed information. But dispersed information inevitably includes some non-public data. * Company employees know project progress. * Government officials know policy directions. * Campaign teams know internal polls. * Military personnel know operational plans. * Supply chain staff know capacity changes. * Traders know order flow. If these people are completely barred from participating, the market loses some informational advantage. If they can participate, the market risks being accused of encouraging corruption and insider trading. This is the most difficult institutional dilemma prediction markets face. Economists love prediction markets because they can aggregate information. Regulators dislike prediction markets because they might reward illegal information acquisition. Therefore, the future mature prediction markets are unlikely to be fully open. They are more likely to be highly layered markets: * Retail can trade low-sensitivity events; * Institutions can trade compliant, vetted events; * Government officials, candidates, insiders are restricted from participation; * Events like war, assassination, death, military operations are strictly prohibited; * Platforms must establish monitoring, KYC, anomaly trading reporting, and penalty mechanisms. This sacrifices some “openness” but enables mainstream adoption. * * * ### The opportunity for 5(c) also comes from this tightening regulation Many see regulation as a negative for prediction markets. Short-term, yes. Long-term, perhaps not. Stricter regulation favors infrastructure companies. Why? Because once the industry begins to comply, platforms will need: * Identity verification; * Trading monitoring; * Insider trading detection; * Market manipulation recognition; * Contract review; * Settlement dispute resolution; * Cross-platform risk management; * Institutional-grade data recording; * Auditing and reporting systems. None of these can be fully handled internally by Polymarket or Kalshi alone. This is the opportunity for 5(c). It bets on an ecosystem that’s not just about “getting more people to bet,” but more importantly, about enabling prediction markets to enter the financial system. If early prediction markets relied on hype, traffic, political events, and crypto funding, the next phase depends on institutionalization. Institutionalization is slow but allows big money to flow in. It bets on three things: **First, that events will become asset classes** Past financial markets traded profits, interest rates, commodities, currencies, volatility. Prediction markets aim to trade “events.” This could be a new asset class. **Second, prediction markets will centralize** Only a few platforms will have real liquidity. Polymarket and Kalshi are currently the strongest front-end gateways. **Third, behind the front-end, the greatest value is in the back-end** Market-making, data, indices, risk management, settlement, compliance tools will become the profit pools of this industry. 5(c) doesn’t need to judge who will ultimately win between Polymarket and Kalshi. It only needs to judge: will this industry grow? If yes, then infrastructure investment opportunities will emerge. This is also why the CEOs of these two competitors can simultaneously become investors. They are not supporting a common competitor; they are buying insurance for the market foundation both will need in the future.
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