The Enlightenment from Liu Bang's Late-Life Power Struggles

A non-cooperative game model of mutual deterrence and testing each other's willingness to concede. In the court of Emperor Gaozu Liu Bang in his later years, a game over succession quietly unfolded. Liu Bang attempted to depose Crown Prince Liu Ying and appoint King Zhao Liu Ruyi as his successor, but faced strong opposition from court officials. Ultimately, Liu Bang conceded, avoiding a disastrous outcome. The chicken game model offers insights into life and work: in conflicts, achieving a decent result doesn't require relentless confrontation. By occasionally adopting a tough stance but mostly making concessions to create uncertainty, the goal can be reached.

1. The Reasons Behind Liu Bang's Change of Crown Prince
Background: In his later years, Liu Bang favored Lady Qi and her son Liu Ruyi. Lady Qi wept day and night demanding the removal of Crown Prince Liu Ying.
Reason 1: Liu Ruyi resembled Liu Bang, attracting psychological similarity effects.
Reason 2: Liu Bang wanted the successor to continue his strong rule and prevent the empire's collapse.
Reason 3: He aimed to balance Lü Hou's influence and prevent her family from gaining unchecked power.
2. Zhou Chang's Defiance and the Idiom Allusion
Opposition: The attempt to depose the crown prince was strongly opposed by court officials, with Zhou Chang protesting most vigorously.
Idiom: Zhou Chang stammered, saying "I know it’s impossible," which led to the idiom "期期艾艾" (stammering and hesitant).
Result: Liu Bang was amused and temporarily abandoned the plan to depose the crown prince.
3. Zhao Yao's Advice and Zhou Chang's Appointment
Concern: Liu Bang worried that Liu Ruyi would not fare well after his death.
Advice: Zhao Yao suggested appointing a noble and strong prime minister for Liu Ruyi.
Appointment: Liu Bang appointed Zhou Chang as Prime Minister of Zhao.
4. Analysis of the Chicken Game Model
Definition: Describes a non-cooperative game where two participants deter and test each other's willingness to concede in potentially disastrous conflicts.
Example: Two drivers approaching each other on a narrow road; if both stay tough, they collide (huge loss). If one is tough and the other turns, the tough driver gains advantage but the turner suffers negative payoff. If both turn, the payoff is zero.
Mixed Strategy: Due to lack of coordination, pure strategy equilibrium cannot be achieved, so players choose to execute or turn randomly.
Optimal Probability: By balancing the other’s payoff, the best probability p=1/c (where c is the double-loss) for choosing to be tough.
Conclusion: The larger c is, the less often one needs to threaten; the smaller c is, the more consistently one must be tough.
5. Liu Bang’s Game Strategy
Action: Liu Bang threw the issue of deposing the crown prince into the game, dragging everyone into the chicken game.
Result: Officials like Zhou Chang resisted strongly, but Liu Bang was amused by Zhou Chang’s stammer and conceded, avoiding a disastrous outcome.
Follow-up: Liu Bang appointed Zhou Chang to assist Liu Ruyi, maximizing Lü Hou’s collision costs and ensuring Liu Ruyi’s safety.
6. Final Thoughts
Insight: In conflicts, one does not need to be relentlessly tough. Occasional toughness combined with mostly making concessions can create uncertainty and help achieve objectives.